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ABSTRACT
We introduce a new channel, which consists of an interference chan-
nel (IC) in parallel with an interference relay channel (IRC), to an-
alyze the interaction between two selfish and cognitive transmitters
who compete for a relay implementing the amplify-and-forward pro-
tocol. It is shown that whatever the relay location there is always an
equilibrium in the resource allocation game where the users selfishly
share their power between the IC and IRC. The uniqueness and de-
termination of this equilibrium is analyzed for two cases: the relay
amplification gain is fixed; the IRC direct links are negligible. We
show how to exploit this analysis to optimally locate the relay either
in terms of individual rate or system sum-rate. Simulations are pro-
vided and show, in particular, how the users’ selfish behavior leads
to sharing the space in regions where the relay is used by only one
user or not used at all.
Index Terms— Cognitive radio, interference channel, open
spectrum access, power allocation game, relay channel.
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, spectrum congestion has become more
and more a critical issue. This is one of the reasons why major ac-
tors in this arena like the Federal Communications Commission has
released important reports providing a legal framework for deploy-
ing technologies like ultra wideband (UWB) or cognitive radio [1].
The latter technology has benefited from a more general consensus
in part because its way of re-using the spectrum generates much less
interference than UWB systems. Cognitive terminals (CTs), based
on spectrum sensing capabilities, are envisioned to be able to op-
portunistically and efficiently re-exploit the spectrum “left-overs” of
other systems. In particular, more and more wireless devices operate
in unlicensed bands, which gives to CTs a particular interest in lo-
cally exploiting the unused spectral resources, for instance, to boost
they transmission rate or quality of communication. The technical is-
sues addressed in this paper fall within this framework. More specif-
ically, our main motivation is to acquire a better understanding of a
system where two cognitive transmitters, each of them communicat-
ing with their respective receivers, are offered the opportunity to use
a relay operating in its own frequency band. We assume that these
two transmitters can choose freely their resource allocation policies
in order to selfishly maximize their transmission rates and, for this
purpose, compete for the available relay node. Several key ques-
tions arise: Is there a predictable state (equilibrium) at which this
system will operate? Is it unique? How is interference self-managed
by selfish and free users? For a given propagation scenario, what is
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the point at which the relay should be located to optimize a given
performance metric?
The system under investigation can be modeled by a frequency
non-selective (FNS) interference channel (IC) [2] in parallel with an
FNS interference relay channel (IRC) [3, 4]. To the best authors’
knowledge, the closest contributions to those presented in this paper
are [3, 4, 5, 6]. In [5] the authors consider the multiuser power con-
trol problem in a frequency-selective IC, which is modeled as a non-
cooperative game where the players want to maximize their individ-
ual transmission rates. In [6] the authors study the same channel but
in their formulation the users selfishly minimize their transmit power
under a minimal achievable rate constraint. In [3, 4] the authors in-
troduce the IRC and focus on evaluating achievable rate regions for
this channel when the links are assumed to be FNS. Here, we not
only want to study a new channel but we also adopt a different point
of view than [3, 4]. Indeed the game-theoretic formulation of the
problem is particularly relevant here since the users are not only in-
teracting because of interference in each of the two sub-channels,
but they are also cognitive and therefore able to observe their envi-
ronment and react to it accordingly.
This paper is structured as follows. We introduce the general
system model in Sec. 2. We define and analyze the corresponding
power allocation (PA) game in Sec. 3. Then we provide a thorough
analysis of two cases of practical interest: the case where the relay
amplification gain is fixed (Sec. 4); the case where the IRC direct
links are negligible (Sec. 5). In Sec. 6, we introduce a Stackelberg
formulation to optimize the relay location. Our analysis is illustrated
by simulations in Sec. 7. Conclusions are given in Sec. 8.
2. GENERAL SYSTEM MODEL
The system under investigation comprises two source nodes S1, S2
sending their message to their respective destination node D1, D2 in
a certain frequency band (denoted by (a)), which is assumed to be
unitary. Additionally there is one relaying node R that is available
on an additional and orthogonal frequency band (denoted by (b)),
also unitary. The signals transmitted by S1 and S2 in the bands (a)
and (b), denoted by X(a)1 , X
(b)
1 , X
(a)
2 , X
(b)
2 , are assumed to be inde-
pendent and subject to power constraints: ∀i ∈ {1, 2},E|X(a)i |2 +
E|X(b)i |2 ≤ Pi. The relay implements a zero-delay scalar amplify-
and-forward (AF) protocol and operates in the full-duplex mode (we
propose a way of making this assumption reasonable in Sec. 5) and
subject to the constraint E|X(b)r |2 ≤ Pr . Under these assumptions,
and denoting by gij , hij the channel gains between Si,Dj andR on
bands (a) and (b) respectively, the received baseband signals write:
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We consider a realistic situation where only large scale prop-
agation effects can be taken into account by the users to optimize
their rate. Thus the channel gains are considered non time-varying.
Concerning channel state information (CSI), we will always assume
coherent communications between each pair (Si,Di) whereas at the
transmitters the information assumptions will be context-depending
and therefore provided in the corresponding sections. The variances
of the zero-mean additive white Gaussian complex noises Z(a)k ,
Z
(b)
k , Z
(b)
r with k ∈ {1, 2} are denoted by N (a)k , N (b)k , N (b)r . At
last ar corresponds to the relay amplification gain and is, in gen-
eral, a function of θ1 and θ2 where ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, θiPi , E|X(b)i |2.
As the relay is subject to a power constraint the amplification gain
ar(θ1, θ2) cannot be chosen arbitrarily. In Sec. 3 and 5 we choose
ar =
√
Pr
E|Y (b)r |2
=
√
Pr
|h1r|2P1θ1+|h2r|2P2θ2+N(b)r
. In this way one
is ensured that the relay makes use of all its available power while
respecting the limiting constraint. However, in Sec. 4 we choose
ar = const. = ar(1, 1). To conclude this section note that will call
the state of the network the vector of power fractions that the users
allocate to the IRC i.e. θ = (θ1, θ2).
3. GENERAL POWER ALLOCATION GAME
One of our goals is to know how the transmitters are going to al-
locate their powers between the the IC and IRC, given the fact that
are able to observe each other and react accordingly. This situation
of interaction corresponds to a game, and more precisely to a non-
cooperative strategic-form game. The players of the game are the
two transmitters. The strategy of transmitter i consists in choosing
θi in his strategy set Ai = [0, 1] in order to maximize his individual
rate, which is chosen to be his utility. Note that we implicitly assume
Gaussian codebooks for the two users since this choice is optimum
for both or them. The utility function for user i ∈ {1, 2} is thus
given by ui = R
(a)
i +R
(b)
i whereR
(a)
i = C(η
(a)
i ), R
(b)
i = C(η
(b)
i ),
C(x) = log2(1 + x) is the capacity function and
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with ∀(i, s) ∈ {1, 2} × {a, b}, ρ(s)i = PiN(s)i
and j = −i (standard
notation to refer to the whole set of players except for player i). In
order to gain in terms of clarity, WLOG we will assume in the sequel
that ∀(i, s) ∈ {1, 2} × {a, b}, N (s)i = N (b)r = N and therefore
introduce the quantities ∀i ∈ {1, 2, r}, ρi = PiN .
As mentioned in the introduction a desirable feature of networks
where users take their decisions by themselves is the existence of one
or several states at which users will operate with a certain degree of
stability. In this respect, the Nash equilibrium (NE) [7] corresponds
to a state of the network that verifies the minimum condition of sta-
bility i.e. if one user deviates from this state while the other users
do not deviate from it, he looses in terms of utility, and therefore re-
turns to his original strategy. This translates mathematically by the
following definition.
Definition 3.1 (Nash equilibrium) The state θ∗ is a pure NE if
∀i ∈ {1, 2},∀θ′i ∈ Ai, ui(θ∗i , θ∗−i) ≥ ui(θ′i, θ∗−i).
Is there such an equilibrium in the proposed system? The answer is
given through the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 (Existence of an NE) Let ûi = R(a)i + R̂
(b)
i be the
modified utility function for user i, where R̂(b)i is the transmission
rate user i obtains on band (b) by transmitting on it with power θiPi
αi
during a fraction of time αi ∈ [0, 1] and with zero power for the rest
of the time. Assuming these utility functions, there will always be an
NE in the general PA game.
The proof of this theorem is based on Theorem 1 of [8]. In [8] Rosen
provides sufficient conditions for the existence of an NE. If, for ev-
ery player 1) his strategy set is convex and compact, 2) his utility
is continuous in the vector of strategies and 3) concave in his own
strategy, then the existence of at least one NE is guaranteed. In our
setup it is easy to check that conditions 1) and 2) are met both for ûi
and ui. However checking condition 3) for the utility ui leads to ex-
pressions that are not easy to manipulate. This is the reason why we
introduced the new utility ûi. Indeed, as we want the user utility to
be his (Shannon) transmission rate, it necessarily has to be a concave
function of θiPi. Therefore, even if the achievable rate ui turned out
to be non-concave, user i can always apply a time-sharing procedure
for the rate R(b)i to make it concave, which is precisely what is done
in Theorem 4.1.
The uniqueness issue is however more difficult to be dealt with
properly, especially because of space limitations. In particular, prov-
ing the diagonal strict concavity condition from Theorem 2 by Rosen
[8] is much more mathematically demanding. For this reason and be-
cause the general PA game is also the most demanding one in terms
of CSI at the transmitters, we will only present simulation results
for this case and rather provide a thorough theoretical analysis of
two special but practical cases. After observing many simulation
results and analyzing several special cases of the general game, we
conjecture that the uniqueness is not guaranteed only in very special
scenarios that have little chance to occur.
4. CASE OF A FIXED AMPLIFICATION GAIN
Although choosing ar(θ1, θ2) as above allows the relay to exploit all
its power, it involves some knowledge on the channels at S1,S2,R
and a certain relay structure, which is not always available. In par-
ticular, it assumes at the relay the presence of a mechanism to esti-
mate the power of the received signal. While this can be easy for a
digital relay transceiver that knows the possible training sequences
used by the sources, it might be impossible if the relay is imposed
to be a (dummy) analog power amplifier. At the sources, the knowl-
edge in terms of channel gains (path losses) depends on the way
the PA algorithm is implemented. In the case where the Cournot
taˆtonnement process (see e.g. [9]) converges, user i needs to know
∀(k, s) ∈ {1, 2} × {a, b}, ρ(s)k , Pr , gii, hii, hir , hri and hjj and
hjr with j = −i. This process will be detailed further. What matters
at this point is that, depending on the amplification gain chosen, the
degree of knowledge at the terminals can be more a less severe. In
this section we assume that ar is a certain constant w.r.t. θ, denoted
by Ar , and meets the power constraint. An interesting issue, a pos-
sible extension, is the analysis of the optimal amplification gain and
whether saturating the relay power constraint may be suboptimal.
Here, we restrict our attention on the case where Ar = ar(1, 1)
which is a simple choice meeting the relay power constraint and can
be improved if some statistical information is available. As the case
ar = Ar is a special case of the general PA game analyzed in Sec.
3 the existence of an NE is guaranteed thanks to Theorem 3.2. In
fact, in the special case under investigation the concavification pro-
cedure is not necessary and ui can be shown to be a concave function
of θi. As for the uniqueness issue, assuming no constraints on the
users’ strategies, the following theorem provides the condition under
which it is ensured and corresponding selfish PA policy.
Theorem 4.1 (Uniqueness of the NE when ar(θ) = Ar) For
(i, j) ∈ {(1, 2), (2, 1)}, let αii = 2|gii|2|Arhrihir + hii|2ρi,
αij = |gji|2|Arhrihir + hii|2ρj + |gii|2|Arhrihjr + hji|2ρj
and βi = |Arhrihir + hii|2(1 + |gii|2ρi + |gji|2ρj) − |gii|2(1 +
A2r|hri|2). The game has a unique NE if and only if α11α22 −
α12α21 6= 0, given by: θ∗1 = α22β1−α12β2α11α22−α12α21 and θ
∗
2 =
α11β2−α21β1
α11α22−α12α21 .
Note that the assumed condition is mild since it would not be met
in very special configurations of the network (e.g. a symmetric
network). To prove the claimed result we exploit the notion of
best responses (BR). The BR of player i to player j is defined by
BRi(θj) = argmaxθi ui(θ). In general it is a correspondence
but in our case it is just a function. The equilibrium points pre-
cisely correspond to the intersection of the BRs of the two users.
It turns out that, for each i ∈ {1, 2}, the BR is an affine func-
tion of θj with j = −i, which means that we are in the same
situation as in a Cournot duopoly [10]. It can be checked that
BRi(θj) = −αijαii θj +
βi
αii
with j = −i. The provided opti-
mum selfish PA for each user follows. Now, in order to take into
consideration that θi ∈ [0, 1], one just needs to introduce four La-
grangian multipliers and integrate the KKT conditions to impose the
associated constraints.
So far, we have treated the issues of existence, uniqueness and
determination of the NE. By inspecting the solution given by The-
orem 4.1, we see that each user needs to know all channel gains of
the system to optimally exploit the spectrum. Although these gains
correspond to path losses and could be easily acquired in scenar-
ios where they do not vary rapidly over time, it is desirable to relax
the degree of knowledge at the sources. This is precisely what the
Cournot taˆtonnement process allows one to do. The idea is that one
player observes the strategy played by the other player and reacts
accordingly by maximizing his BR and so on. In our context, as the
BRs are affine functions, one is ensured that from any starting state
(θ01, θ
0
2) the procedure will converge to the NE. What does a source
node need to know to implement such a procedure? User i needs to
know the path losses gii, hii, hir , hri, hjr , all the signal-to-noise
ratios ρi, the average level of interference plus noise he undergoes
on each band and of course the strategy played by the other player
θj . The latter quantity can be acquired by a sensing technique based
on a standard estimation procedure, which is particularly easy in fast
fading environment since the path loss can be considered to be con-
stant during a period of time long enough to store a large number of
channel realizations. The other quantities can be acquired through
feedback or sensing mechanisms.
5. CASE OF NEGLIGIBLE DIRECT LINKS
We start this section by providing some motivations for studying
the case where, in the IRC, the signals received through the direct
links can be neglected w.r.t. the signal received from the relay.
In some contexts, especially those where the relay node is fully
exploited, the contribution of the direct link to the received sig-
nal can be marginal. This can happen in environments where the
path loss exponents associated with band (b) are relatively high
(typically > 3). Another situation of practical interest is the case
where the relay is composed of a receiver and transmitter that
are not co-located (e.g. if they are located at the opposite edges
of a building) and the corresponding antennas implement orthog-
onal polarizations (say in order to reasonably meet the full-duplex
requirement). In the latter case, the destination would use a polariza-
tion orthogonal to that used by the source, making its contribution
totally negligible in comparison to that of the relay. As the am-
plification gain assumed here is the one used in Sec. 3, which
saturates the power constraint at the relay. When these propagation
conditions are met, the rates of the users can be approximated by:
u˜i (θ) = C(η˜
(a)
i ) + C(η˜
(b)
i ) with η˜
(a)
i =
|gii|2ρiθi
|gji|2ρjθj+1
, η˜(b)i =
|h1rhr1|2ρrρ1θ1
|h1r|2ρ1θ1+(|h2rhr1|2ρr+|h2r|2)ρ2θ2+|hr1|2ρr+1 , always with j =−i. Here again each rate u˜i is already concave in θi and Theorem 3.2
can be applied without time-sharing. In this case the BRs are given
by BRi (θj) = −βi(θj)+
√
∆i(θj)
2
, where ∆i(θj) = β2i (θj) −
4αiτi(θj), and αi = |gii|2|hir|4(1 + |hri|2ρr)ρ2i , βi(θj) =
2|gii|2|hir|2(1 + |hri|2ρr)ρifi(θj), τi(θj) = |gii|2f2i (θj) −
|hri|2|hir|2[|gii|2ρi + 1 + |gji|2(1 − θj)ρj ]ρrfi(θj), fi(θj) =
(|hjrhri|2 ρr + |hjr|2)ρjθj + |hri|2ρr + 1. It turns out that it
is possible to analyze the properties of these BRs to show that the
uniqueness of the NE is generically guaranteed.
6. OPTIMIZING THE RELAY LOCATION
As the relay location is a determinant factor for the performance
of the users and overall system, we propose here a Stackelberg
formulation of the problem. We introduce a leader in the game
whose strategy is the pair (xR, yR), which indicates the relay
location when assuming a 2D propagation scenario. We con-
sider two choices for the leader’s utility: A) the system sum-rate
u(xR, yR) = u1 [θ∗(xR, yR)] + u2 [θ∗(xR, yR)], B) the rate of a
given user (1 or 2). Choice A) would correspond, for example, to the
case where the system is owned by the same provider or where an
agreement between two providers would have been found whereas
B) would correspond to the case where one of the users would be
able to choose the relay location (picture one WiFi subscriber who
wants to increase his downlink throughput by placing his cellular
phone somewhere in his apartment while his neighbor can also ex-
ploit the same spectral resources). Then, the sources (the followers
of the game) react to the leader’s strategy by choosing their best
selfish PA policies. Interestingly, we know from Theorem 3.2 that
for any location of the relay there will be an equilibrium. The goal
of the leader is to make this equilibrium efficient in the sense of A)
or B).
7. SIMULATION RESULTS
We consider a square cell with side length 2L, L = 10 m. The
source and destination nodes are fixed and located in [−L,L]2 as
follows: S1 :
(− 3L
8
, L
4
)
, S2 :
(−L
4
,− 3L
8
)
, D1 :
(
L
4
, L
16
)
, D2 :
γ(a) 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4
γ(b) 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 4
Pr = 30 3.15 1.51 1 3.42 4.96 1.5 3.42 6.32
Pr = 20 1.9 1 1 1.94 2 1 1.94 2
Table 1. Performance gains brought by adding a relay on the IRC
(
3L
8
,−L
8
)
. Fig. 1 is a temperature image representing the system
sum-rate intensity for which a given pixel corresponds to a given lo-
cation of the relay in the scenario: P1 = 20 dBm, P2 = 17 dBm,
Pr = 27 dBm, N
(a)
1 = N
(b)
1 = 10 dBm, N
(a)
2 = N
(b)
2 = 9 dBm,
N
(b)
r = 7 dBm and the path loss exponents γ(a) = 2, γ(b) = 2.5.
This scenario and all the (numerous) scenarios we analyzed showed
that the optimal location for the relay is on one of the two seg-
ments originating from two sources to their respective destination.
The question of which segment is the best and where to put the re-
lay on this segment can be determined (at least) numerically. Even
though space is missing to fully interpret and possibly prove this
result, we will just mention that this can be roughly explained by
the fact that the individual rate of a given user is maximized on the
segment between him and his destination, which results from the
optimal (selfish) tradeoff between the strength of the received signal
and the amount of interference he undergoes. Fig. 2 is a temperature
image representing the power fraction θi user i allocates to the IRC
for the different positions of the relay in the cell for the scenario:
P1 = P2 = 17 dBm, Pr = 23 dBm, N
(a)
1 = N
(b)
1 = 10 dBm,
N
(a)
2 = N
(b)
2 = 9 dBm, N
(b)
r = 7 dBm, γ(a) = 2, γ(b) = 3.
Interestingly, this typical scenario shows that the regions where the
transmitters uses some power to use the relay do not overlap. This
means that, the selfish behavior of the users towards using the re-
lay is self-regulated, which naturally leads to delineating frontiers
above which the relay is left for the other user or not used at all. We
also provide Tab. 7 which shows the influence of the path loss ex-
ponents, the relay power level (dBm) on the ratio of sum-rate with
relay to that with no relay for: N (a)1 = 7 dBm, N
(a)
2 = 9 dBm,
N
(b)
1 = N
(b)
2 = Nr = 10 dBm, P1 = 20 dBm, P2 = 22 dBm.
At last, we would like to mention that other simulations have shown
that introducing fading does not change our conclusions provided
that ergodic rates are considered.
8. CONCLUSION
We have studied a simplified scenario of the general situation where
a set of source-destination pairs coexist on the same unlicensed band
and can opportunistically exploit an additional band for which re-
lay nodes are available. We have seen that it is not only possible
to show the existence of an equilibrium in the proposed scenario,
but also that it is generically unique and it is possible to determine
it. It is also possible to determine the optimum relay location for
a given performance index and analyze the way the interference is
self-managed by the users in such a network. This shows that in un-
licensed networks with multiple relay nodes, the selfish behavior of
cognitive users could self-regulate the amount of interference in the
network. The approach introduced in this work should therefore be
generalized to more complex networks in terms of topology but also
by introducing mobility and different relaying protocols.
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